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PRECEDENTIAL   
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1969 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
STEVEN I. WALLACE, 
                     Appellant 
______ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 1:10-cr-182-02) 
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane 
______ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 5, 2011 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, BARRY, and VAN ANTWERPEN, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 06, 2011) 
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James V. Wade, Esq. 
Ronald A. Krauss, Esq. 
Asst. Federal Public Defender — Appeals 
100 Chestnut Street, Suite 306 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101 
  Counsel for Appellant 
 
Peter J. Smith, Esq. 
Stephen R. Cerutti II, Esq. 
United States Attorney‟s Office 
Middle District of Pennsylvania 
Ronald Reagan Federal Building 
Suite 220 
228 Walnut Street 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108 
  Counsel for Appellee  
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
          
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. Background 
 Steven Wallace pleaded guilty to criminal conspiracy 
to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  The District Court sentenced 
him to 70 months of imprisonment.  Wallace appeals his 
sentence, arguing that the District Court committed 
procedural error by classifying a crime he committed at the 
age of sixteen as a “prior felony conviction” under § 4B1.2 of 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (hereinafter 
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“Guidelines”).  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm 
the District Court‟s sentence. 
 
The factual and procedural history of this case may be 
summarized as follows.  On June 9, 2010, a grand jury 
returned a single-count indictment charging Wallace, along 
with three others, with engaging in a conspiracy to distribute 
and possess with intent to distribute in excess of 50 kilograms 
of marijuana.  Later, Wallace reached an agreement with the 
Government whereby the Government filed an information 
charging him with conspiring to distribute and possess with 
intent to distribute an unspecified amount of marijuana.  
Wallace pleaded guilty to this charge on November 23, 2010. 
  
The United States Probation Office submitted a pre-
sentence report (“PSR”) calculating Wallace‟s guideline 
range as 77 to 96 months of incarceration.  Both the offense 
level and criminal history calculation was based on Wallace‟s 
designation as a career offender under § 4B1.1 of the 
Guidelines.  The PSR included a New York State conviction 
for first degree robbery (“New York State conviction”).  
Wallace was sixteen years old at the time of his arrest for this 
offense, seventeen years old at the time of the conviction, and 
was granted a “youthful offender” adjudication by the New 
York State court.
1
  The District Court concluded that the 
                                              
1
  Under New York law, an individual between the ages of 
sixteen and nineteen may be deemed an “eligible youth” if he 
is charged with a criminal offense and fulfills other specified 
conditions.  N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 720.10(1)-(2).  If 
classified as an eligible youth, the court will vacate and 
replace the conviction with a youthful offender finding.  Id. at 
§ 720.20(3). 
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conviction should be considered for the career offender 
designation.  The New York State conviction, and Wallace‟s 
2002 conviction in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York for conspiring to import 
cocaine, provided the requisite convictions to find Wallace 
was a career offender under § 4B1.2.  This in turn increased 
Wallace‟s Guidelines Sentencing range. 
  
Wallace filed a number of objections to the PSR, 
including a challenge to the use of the New York State 
conviction as a basis for his classification as a career 
offender.  Wallace asserted that the Government had failed to 
demonstrate that the New York State conviction should be 
considered an adult conviction for the purposes of the career 
offender enhancement.  The District Court disagreed with 
Wallace, classified the offense as such, and included the 
career offender enhancement in the sentencing calculation. 
 
 Ultimately the District Court granted Wallace a one-
level downward departure regarding his criminal history, and 
sentenced him to 70 months of incarceration and 4 years of 
supervised release.  Wallace timely appealed his sentence and 
claims error in the District Court‟s career offender 
enhancement. 
 
II. Jurisdiction 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.   
 
III. Standard of Review 
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We review a district court‟s interpretation of the 
Guidelines de novo, United States v. Wood, 526 F.3d 82, 85 
(3d Cir. 2008), while reviewing the sentence for abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 599 (3d 
Cir. 2010). 
 
IV. Discussion 
  
 On appeal, Wallace argues that his New York State 
youthful offender adjudication is not an adult conviction and 
thus not an eligible predicate offense for career offender 
status.
2
  Wallace contends that rather than considering the 
New York State conviction for first degree robbery, the 
District Court should have followed a four-element inquiry 
regarding the classification of a New York State youthful 
offender adjudication that Wallace fashions from a line of 
Second Circuit cases.  See United States v. Driskell, 277 F.3d 
150, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[A] court may consider a 
defendant‟s eligible past conviction, even when that 
conviction has been vacated and deemed a youthful offender 
adjudication under New York law, in those situations where, 
as here, the defendant although under age eighteen was tried 
in an adult court, convicted as an adult, and received and 
served a sentence exceeding one year and one month in an 
                                              
2
 Wallace partly relies upon the fact that when he was 
sentenced in 2002 in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York, the judge presiding over his 
sentencing did not consider his youthful offender 
adjudication.  The District Court provided no explanation as 
to why the conviction was not considered, and regardless, its 
decision on how to handle the youthful offender adjudication 
is not binding in this case. 
6 
 
adult prison.”).3  Had the District Court done so,4 Wallace‟s 
four month sentence in a non-adult facility would not have 
satisfied the requirements that the sentence exceed one year 
and one month in an adult facility, and therefore the 
conviction would not have been counted for career offender 
status.  
  
 Wallace‟s proposed adoption of this framework leads 
to his second argument: the District Court did not possess the 
information required to properly analyze the elements.  
Because the District Court did not have the information, 
Wallace argues that it could not have conducted the proper 
analysis. 
 
We reject Wallace‟s arguments, and will affirm the 
District Court in all respects. 
 
                                              
3
 Wallace misconstrues the Second Circuit cases on which he 
relies.  Driskell concerned §§ 4A1.1 and 4A1.2(d) of the 
Guidelines, not the career-offender provisions at issue here.  
277 F.3d at 155.  Before increasing a defendant's criminal 
history by three points, § 4A1.2(d)(1) requires that the 
defendant received a sentence of greater than thirteen months 
for the predicate offense.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 4A1.2 cmt. n.7.  Because §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2 
have no similar requirement, we decline to apply Driskell to 
the career-offender guideline at issue in this case. 
4 
The District Court and counsel on appeal repeatedly refer to 
United States v. Salah, 185 F. App‟x 147 (3d Cir. 2006).  
While they may refer to that case, we note that it is not our 
policy to rely on non-precedential cases in reaching our 
decision. 
7 
 
A.  
The definition of “career offender” is set forth in § 
4B1.1(a) of the Guidelines.   The Guidelines clearly set three 
requirements:  
 
“A defendant is a career offender if (1) the 
defendant was at least eighteen years old at the 
time the defendant committed the instant 
offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of 
conviction is a felony that is either a crime of 
violence or a controlled substance offense; and 
(3) the defendant has at least two prior felony 
convictions of either a crime of violence or a 
controlled substance offense.” 
 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1(a). 
 
 The first two requirements are satisfied here and are 
not challenged by Wallace.  The third requirement, regarding 
two prior felony convictions, is the focus of his appeal.  Note 
1 of the Commentary to § 4B1.2 provides the definition of 
“prior felony conviction”: 
 
“For purposes of [the career offender] 
guideline.... „Prior felony conviction‟ means a 
prior adult federal or state conviction for an 
offense punishable by death or imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year, regardless of 
whether such offense is specifically designated 
as a felony and regardless of the actual sentence 
imposed.  A conviction for an offense 
committed at age eighteen or older is an adult 
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conviction.  A conviction for an offense 
committed prior to age eighteen is an adult 
conviction if it is classified as an adult 
conviction under the laws of the jurisdiction in 
which the defendant was convicted . . . .”  
 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2, cmt. n.1. 
 
 Wallace argues his youthful offender adjudication is 
not an eligible predicate offense that qualifies as a “prior 
felony conviction” under this definition.  Wallace bases this 
argument on his view that this Court should adopt the four-
element inquiry
5
 to determine whether a juvenile conviction 
qualifies as a “prior felony conviction.” 6 
                                              
5
 Again the four elements would be where the defendant (1) 
was tried in an adult court, (2) convicted as an adult, (3) 
received and, (4) served a sentence exceeding one year and 
one month in an adult prison.  See Driskell, 277 F.3d at 154-
55. 
6
 In his reply brief, Wallace states that he is not advocating 
for the adoption of “any rigid test,” but rather for the “Second 
Circuit law [that] requires a non-categorical approach to the 
youthful offender/adult conviction issue, which examines „the 
substance of the prior conviction‟ . . . .”  Any non-categorical 
approach would run counter to United States v. Moorer, 383 
F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 2004), as well as the language of Note 1 of 
the Commentary to § 4B1.2, as discussed below.  A non-
categorical approach would have to include some type of 
analysis and focus on the facts of the prior conviction.  We 
have considered Wallace‟s position to be that the appropriate 
non-categorical approach in this case would be to focus on 
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This Court has made plain that Note 1 to § 4B1.2 
“dictates that the career offender inquiry examine only 
whether the convictions in question are adult convictions, 
and not what kind of sentences resulted from those 
convictions.”  United States v. Moorer, 383 F.3d 164, 168 
(3d Cir. 2004).  In Moorer the defendant-appellant was 
convicted of drug offenses and classified as a career 
offender because of two prior felony convictions.  Id. at 166.  
Moorer argued that one of the prior convictions should not 
be counted because he was sentenced as a juvenile, not an 
adult.  Id. at 167.  This Court stated “the Guidelines belie 
Moorer‟s premise that an adult conviction must be 
accompanied by an adult sentence to count toward career 
offender status.”  Id.   This was because the language in 
Note 1 of the Commentary to § 4B1.2 specifically states that 
a “prior felony conviction” is determined by courts 
“regardless of the actual sentence imposed.”  Id.  “[W]here 
or for how long the defendant is actually sentenced is of no 
import.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  
  
The four-element inquiry that Wallace advocates 
would similarly contradict the Commentary to § 4B1.2.  The 
fourth element of the inquiry requires the defendant to have 
served a sentence exceeding one year and one month in an 
adult prison.  But as this Court held in Moorer, Note 1 of the 
Commentary to § 4B1.2 specifically states that a “prior 
felony conviction” is determined by courts “regardless of 
the actual sentence imposed.”  Moorer, 383 F.3d at 167.  
Wallace‟s proposed analysis thus contravenes this Court‟s 
precedent, as well as the language of the Guidelines, 
                                                                                                     
the same facts that the Second Circuit has focused on in cases 
like Driskell.  
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because the length of the sentence and the type of facility 
where it is served are irrelevant.  
  
In the case before the Court, although we deal with 
New York rather than New Jersey law, Moorer requires that 
we determine if the conviction is an adult conviction.  Our 
analysis is straightforward because although New York‟s 
youthful offender statute vacates and replaces a prior 
conviction, the juvenile eligible for such an adjudication 
must first be “convicted as an adult.”  Driskell, 277 F.3d at 
154-55; see also United States v. Reinoso, 350 F.3d 51, 54 
(2d Cir. 2003) (“[Y]outhful offender adjudication does not 
alter the substance of the defendant‟s adult conviction.”).  
Thus it is clear that under New York law that Wallace‟s 
conviction was an adult conviction, regardless of the 
subsequent youthful offender adjudication.  For that reason 
it was proper for the District Court to consider the 
conviction in determining Wallace‟s career offender status.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‟s sentence. 
 
B.  
 
 Wallace‟s second argument is that because the New 
York State records are sealed, the District Court lacked the 
requisite information to conduct a proper analysis of the 
substance of the state proceedings, as required by the four-
element inquiry he advocates.  Because we hold that the 
four-element inquiry is not the proper method to analyze the 
issue discussed above, and because the length of the 
sentence is irrelevant according to Note 1 of the 
Commentary to § 4B1.2, this argument need not be 
addressed. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the 
appellants conviction and the District Court‟s judgment of 
sentence. 
